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CAN MATERNITY BENEFITS HAVE LONG-TERM EFFECTS ON
CHILDBEARING? EVIDENCE FROM SOVIET RUSSIA
Olga Malkova*
Abstract—This paper quantifies the effects of Russia’s 1981 expansion in
maternity benefits on completed childbearing. The program provided one
year of partially paid parental leave and a small cash transfer upon a
child’s birth. I exploit the program’s two-stage implementation and find
evidence that women had more children as a result of the program.
Fertility rates rose immediately by 8.2% over twelve months. The
increase in fertility rates not only persisted for the ten-year duration of the
program, but it reflected large increases in higher-order births to older
women who already had children before the program started.

I.

Introduction

E

IGHTY-FOUR percent of developed countries offer
subsidies or parental leave benefits at an average cost
of 2.6% of GDP (United Nations, 2013). Some of these programs are tremendously expensive. Countries implement
these programs in part to increase childbearing, because
they are worried that below-replacement-fertility levels
accompanied by an increase in life expectancy may negatively affect their economies in several ways.1 First, this
demographic shift threatens the ability of many countries to
finance old-age benefits. Second, a shrinking working-age
population compared to a rising elderly population may
result in lower economic growth because of a decline in
workers per capita (Bloom et al., 2010). Although maternity
benefits are costly, they may be ineffective if they result in
only a short-run increase in childbearing due to a shift in
timing of childbearing instead of a long-run increase due to
women having more children.
Whether these programs are effective in raising childbearing is an open question. The provision of more generous parental benefits is associated with a country’s demand
for children, which makes estimating the effects of programs themselves difficult. To address this problem, the literature uses a variety of natural experiments in different
Received for publication September 2, 2016. Revision accepted for publication July 24, 2017. Editor: Amitabh Chandra.
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1
The total fertility rate is below replacement in 113 countries (Central
Intelligence Agency, 2013). Population aging is a concern for 92% of
developed countries (United Nations, 2013).

countries to provide evidence that parental leave (Lalive &
Zweimüller, 2009, for Austria) and cash transfer programs
(Cohen, Dehejia, & Romanov, 2013, for Israel; Gonzalez,
2013, for Spain; Milligan, 2005, for Canada) have shortrun, positive effects on childbearing in developed countries. But the limited time horizon of available data and
empirical methods limits inferences about long-run effects.
Consequently, many of the estimated effects may reflect
changes in the timing rather than a permanent increase in
childbearing.
This paper leverages the two-stage introduction of Russia’s 1981 expansion of maternity benefits to evaluate both
its short-run and long-run effects on childbearing. Similar
to the goals of programs in developed countries today, the
program was intended to increase completed childbearing
by providing a sizable expansion in partially paid parental
leave until a child turned 1 year old, unpaid parental leave
until a child turned 18 months, and small cash transfers at
the birth of the first, second, or third child. Eighty-five percent of women were eligible for benefits because they met
the provision stipulating that they be in the labor force.
My research design uses the Soviet government mandate
that the benefits start in 1981 in 32 oblasts (similar to states;
I call these oblasts ‘‘early beneficiaries’’), and then in 50
oblasts (‘‘late beneficiaries’’) one year later. The historical
vantage point allows me to estimate long-run effects of the
maternity benefits expansion. Another contribution of the
project is the reconstruction of Russian population and
characteristics of regional data from recovered vital statistics, censuses, yearbooks, and surveys, which I cull and
translate from published sources.
My results show that the 1981 Russian maternity benefit
program is associated with an immediate and sustained
increase in childbearing. Fertility rates rose immediately
after the program started by approximately 8.2% in the first
twelve months. The elasticity of fertility rates with respect
to a change in cost of a child (for the first 18 years) is 3.7,
which is in the range of short-run effects found in other studies.2 Three empirical findings underscore that this increase
reflects higher completed childbearing. First, period fertility
rates remained on average 14.6% higher for the ten-year
duration of the program. Second, children born after the
expansion were more likely to have been higher-order
births. Third, these higher-parity children were born to
mothers who were older and had a longer interval since her
previous birth.
2
Using prior literature estimates, I calculate elasticities: 4.4 in Austria, 3.8 in Spain, and 4.1 in Canada, while 0.54 is already reported
in Israel.
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This study is the first to find a positive effect of maternity
benefits on long-run fertility rates.3 This is at odds with
some papers that have argued that maternity benefits have
small or no effects on raising short-run fertility rates and
long-run childbearing (Demeny, 1986; Gauthier & Hatzius,
1997).4 Theoretically, maternity benefits could decrease
childbearing over the longer term. To demonstrate this, I
develop two theoretical extensions of the Becker and Lewis
(1973) model that incorporate two types of maternity benefits: paid leave, which lowers the opportunity cost of childbearing, and a cash transfer, which increases income. The
first extension allows parents to choose both the number of
children and their level of investments in each child
(‘‘quality’’), which has the well-known effect of making the
income effect theoretically ambiguous. The second extension achieves the same result through nonstandard channels: by allowing women to make endogenous choices
about their time off from work.
Theoretically, the effect of maternity benefits on childbearing depends on the shadow price of a child and on
income (Becker, 1965; Galor & Weil, 1999). Less educated
and more rural areas experienced a greater increase in fertility rates for the duration of the program. Maternity benefits
may have had long-run effects on childbearing in Russia
because Russian women had both low opportunity costs
and low costs of raising children. My best evidence on this
comes from the fact that Russian women had lower earnings compared to men and a flatter age-earnings profile than
women in other countries (Brainerd, 2000; Gregory &
Kohlhase, 1988). They also had access to widespread and
affordable preschool care for children of all ages.
Although my findings suggest that disadvantaged
mothers increased their childbearing the most, I find no
effect of maternity benefits on outcomes of children in
adulthood. This effect reflects both the direct effect due to
the change in the time spent with children and in household
income, as well as the indirect effect due to the change in
the composition of mothers. Children born one year after
maternity benefits started had similar educational, economic, and family structure outcomes compared to the children born right before.
In summary, this paper shows that maternity benefits can
have an effect on both short-run and long-run childbearing
behavior. In the Russian case, the program induced nearly 5
million births over its duration, where an extra birth cost
the government about 1.4 times a year’s average national
earnings. However, behavioral responses to maternity bene-

fits may vary across contexts and will reflect the interaction
of maternity benefits with other social programs.

3
Lalive and Zweimüller (2009) find that women who randomly
received extra paid leave for the first child were more likely to have a second child. However, their result may be due to additional eligibility for
automatic renewal of benefits if a second birth happened up to 27.5
months after the first birth and is not applicable to typical interventions
affecting benefits for future births.
4
Papers on the United States focus on low-income women and find
inconclusive evidence on effects of welfare policies on childbearing
(Hoynes, 1997; Moffitt, 1998).

5
All full citations to Soviet laws and newspaper articles are listed in
online appendix A. Laws have citations that start with ‘‘Goskomtrud,’’
‘‘Presidium,’’ and ‘‘TSK KPSS.’’ I also cite two major newspapers:
Pravda and Izvestija.
6
Women in the Central Asia republics were the majority of beneficiaries of income-tested and higher-parity birth benefits. Mobility from
these republics was low. Thus, the government sought to provide incentives for childbearing in regions with lower populations and labor
shortages.

II.

Russian Family Benefits

Before 1981, the major beneficiaries of family subsidies
were families with many children or low-income families.
From 1947, women received a one-time payment beginning
with their third child and monthly supplements until a
child’s fifth birthday beginning with their fourth child (Presidium Verhovnogo Soveta, 1947).5 In addition, after 1974,
families with per capita income below a threshold received
monthly supplements for each child under the age of eight
(Presidium Verhovnogo Soveta, 1974). However, many
families were not eligible for these benefits.
The government also provided benefits to working mothers
but did not provide financial support for women who wanted
to stay home with a child for a longer period of time. The
most generous benefit was a fully paid maternity leave of 56
days before and 56 days after a birth. In addition, women
could take an unpaid job-protected parental leave until a child
turned 1 year old (Goskomtrud, 1970). Job-protected leave
was an important feature in Soviet Russia, where about half
of the labor force consisted of women in 1980.
In the late 1970s, the Soviet government formulated a
pronatalist policy with the goal of encouraging all women
to have second and third births. The government was interested in securing the replacement level of children ‘‘from
each physically and morally healthy family, instead of a
maximum of children from a minimum of families’’ (Desfosses, 1981). One of the motivations was the desire to
achieve greater population growth in areas with labor
shortages (DiMaio, 1981).6 In January 1978, Litvinova
(1978), the senior research associate with the Institute of
State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences, wrote
that ‘‘the state cannot be indifferent to what kind of population increase occurs, whether it is highly mobile or, owing
to a variety of circumstances (including large families and
language barriers), bound to one specific region.’’
A. Description of the Maternity Benefits Expansion

The outcome of these discussions was the 1981 maternity
benefit program that aimed to increase childbearing by providing ‘‘good conditions for population growth,’’ to ‘‘ease the
status of working mothers,’’ and to ‘‘decrease the differences
in standard of living depending on having children’’ (TSK
KPSS, 1981). This program provided three new benefits.
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First, women received partially paid parental leave until a
child turned 1 year old, which was a flat monthly payment
equaling 27% of the average national female monthly salary.7
Paid parental leave was the most substantial part of the program and was the same for all parities. Second, women could
keep their job while staying home until their child turned 18
months old. Third, women received a small one-time cash
transfer: 38% and 76% of the average national monthly salary
for first and second or third births, respectively.8 Although
this one-time transfer was 100% more for the second and
third birth, the sum of partially paid leave and the transfer for
second and third births was only 9% more than the sum for
first births, once partially paid leave is included.
Unlike previous programs for poor or large families,
most families were eligible for benefits. Women who
worked for at least a year as well as students regardless of
work experience were eligible.9 Nonworking women were
also eligible for a small one-time flat transfer for first, second, and third births, equaling about 20% of the average
national female monthly wage. Given that 85% of women
were employed and 59% of college students were women,
this program covered the vast majority of women. Notably,
the program left previous means-tested benefits and benefits
for large families unchanged.10
Although the benefits lasted about ten years, women
likely expected them to stay in place permanently. The government had never canceled previous benefits and typically
expanded them. In fact, in 1989, partially paid and unpaid
leaves were expanded to 18 months and 3 years after birth,
respectively (Sovmin, 1989). However, by 1992, hyperinflation reduced the benefit to almost 0, and the subsequent
collapse of the Soviet Union ended the program.
III.

Expected Effects of Russian Maternity
Benefits on Childbearing

Introducing paid parental leave and birth transfers
directly reduced the cost of having a child for working
women. In the neoclassical consumer model, parents maximize utility, U(n, z), choosing the quantity of children, n,
and another consumption good, z. Parents face a simple lifetime budget constraint, [t(wf  a)  b]n þ pzz ¼ T(wf þ
wm), where both the husband and wife can work for units of
time, T, while the wife receives wf for her work and the husband receives wm for his work. I assume that only women
take time off, t, to take care of each child, for which they
receive a benefit, a, thus making the benefit-adjusted oppor7
Women received ten payments (fully paid leave covered the first two
months after birth): 50 rubles per month in Siberia, the Far East, and the
Northern regions and 35 rubles in the rest of Russia. However, benefits represented the same share of the average regional monthly salary (27%).
8
The one-time transfer was 50 and 100 rubles for the first and second/
third child, respectively.
9
Students from universities, professional, technical, and clinical
schools were eligible.
10
Only the one-time transfer for a third birth increased from 20 to 100
rubles.
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tunity cost of child rearing, tðwf  aÞ.11 Finally, women
receive a cash transfer, b, for each child, and spend pz on
each unit of consumption good, z.
This model predicts that both an increase in paid leave,
a, and cash transfers, b, will increase the number of children, as long as children are normal goods.12 However, the
number of children need not increase when the cost of children decreases, even if children are normal goods, once the
model also allows parents to choose quality or choose
mothers’ time off from work.
A. Maternity Benefits with Endogenous Choice
of Child Quantity and Quality

Maternity benefits may lead women to have fewer children
due to the interaction of quantity and quality. It may become
optimal for women to have fewer children if they invest more
in each child because of the benefits, producing children of a
higher quality. To demonstrate this, I incorporate the choice of
child quality, q, in the neoclassical consumer model. Parents
maximize utility,
  U(n, q, z) and
 face a lifetime budget constraint, pqn þ t wf  a  b n þ pz z ¼ Tðwf þ wm Þ, paying, p, for a quality unit of a child, which they must spend on
each child individually, such as college tuition. This budget
constraint differs from the one in the standard quantity-quality
model (Becker & Lewis, 1973; Willis, 1973), because it incorporates maternity benefits into the cost of a child. Using this
framework, appendix C shows that the elasticity of childbearing with respect to parental leave can be expressed as the
weighted sum of the income ([i) and substitution ([s) elasticities, dln(n)/dln(a) ¼ (atn/I)[i þ [s. Proposition 1 and corollary
1 show that even if children are normal goods, the observed
effect of an increase in income through the introduction of paid
leave and a cash transfer on childbearing may be negative.
Proposition 1. The effect of parental leave, a, on childbearing, n, is positive if the difference of the true income
elasticity for quantity and the true income elasticity for
quality, gn  gq , is sufficiently large enough (condition for
the income elasticity to be positive).13
Proof. See appendix C. Also see appendix C for corollary 1, which focuses on the elasticity with respect to the
cash transfer, b, and its proof.
B. Maternity Benefits with Endogenous Choice of Time Off

Another way maternity benefits may lead women to have
fewer children is through the interaction of quantity and time
11
This model does not limit the length of paid leave, t, but it is less than
one year in this context.
12
This reflects that the effect of maternity benefits, dn/da and dn/db, is
the sum of income and substitution effects, which are both positive. A
growing empirical literature suggests that husband’s earnings (Lindo,
2010; Black et al., 2013) and housing wealth (Lovenheim & Mumford,
2013) have positive effects on completed childbearing.
13
gn and gq use a measure of income calculated using shadow prices
(marginal costs) whose ratios in equilibrium are equal to the marginal
rates of substitution in the utility function.
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off from work. To see this, I extend the neoclassical consumer model by incorporating the choice of time off from work,
t, for the mother. Households maximize
  utility,
 Uðn;
 t; zÞ, and
face a lifetime budget constraint, t wf  a  b n þ pz z ¼
Tðwf þ wm Þ. Unlike in the quantity-quality extension, the
household’s problem no longer involves quality, but the
mother may now choose time off from work, t, while paying
wages less the parental leave benefit, wf  a, for each time
unit spent out of the labor force for each child.
A notable feature of parental leave benefits is that they
subsidize not only the quantity but also potentially the
quality of children because they reduce the opportunity
cost of the mother’s time with her child.14 This feature renders the interpretation of time off from work, t, as similar
to that of quality, q, in the previous extension. If women
spend more time out of the labor force when they have
access to partially paid leave, it may result in a greater cost
of a child in a world with paid leave compared to the world
with unpaid leave. Using this framework, appendix C
shows that the elasticity of childbearing with respect to
parental leave can be expressed in the same form as when
child quality was endogenous. Proposition 2 and corollary
2 show that even if children are normal goods, the effect of
paid leave and a cash transfer on childbearing may be
negative.
Proposition 2. The effect of parental leave, a, on childbearing is positive if the difference of the true income elasticity of quantity and the true income elasticity of time off,
Zn  Zt, is sufficiently large enough (condition for the
income elasticity to be positive) and the partial elasticity of
substitution between n and t, snt, is positive (condition for
the substitution elasticity to be positive).
Proof. See appendix C. Also see appendix C for corollary 2, which focuses on the elasticity with respect to the
cash transfer, b, and its proof.
The extension of job protection from 1 year to 18 months
may increase or decrease completed childbearing. This
extension lowers the labor market costs of a birth and
allows women to have another child up to 20 months after
birth (14 months before the policy was extended), while
keeping their job and becoming eligible for new maternity
benefits.15 This may result in an increase in completed
childbearing and in women having subsequent births
sooner. However, taking more unpaid leave may lead
women to have fewer children because the increase in their
forgone earnings may result in a greater cost of a child.16
14
Mother’s time with a child may improve child quality if preschool or
the care of relatives are not perfect substitutes. In this context, subsidized
preschool was available since the age of 2 months.
15
A woman became eligible for fully paid maternity benefits two
months before a birth.
16
The intuition is similar to the one in proposition 2, but now the time
off from work is unpaid.

TABLE 1.—CHARACTERISTICS OF EARLY AND LATE BENEFICIARY OBLASTS
Type of Beneficiary

Early

Late

Proportion of population in 1979
With college degree among employed
With less than high school among employed
Employed among women ages 15 to 54
In rural areas among women ages 15 to 44
In preschool among children younger than 7
Ages 15 to 44 among women
Ages 65 years and older among women

9.0%
46.3%
84.1%
25.7%
52.5%
46.6%
9.6%

9.1%
48.6%
85.5%
24.9%
51.9%
42.0%
14.7%

General fertility rate in 1980
Higher parity fertility rate in 1980
Number of oblasts
Share population living in oblasts

75.9
37.4
37
26.5%

67.1
31.6
51
73.5%

Sources: 1979 Soviet Census; 1979 Narodnoe Hozyaystvo yearbook; Rosstat; 2010 Russian Census.

IV.

Rollout of Russian Maternity Benefits

On January 22, 1981, the Soviet government passed a ruling
about its intention to expand maternity benefits (TSK KPSS,
1981). The ruling described the components of the program,
the exact benefit amounts, and eligibility requirements.17 The
ruling stated that the program was to be implemented in waves
around the country. The early beneficiaries of the program
were the Far East, Siberia, and the Northern regions, while the
late beneficiaries were the rest of the Russian regions. The
announcement stated that the early beneficiaries would start
receiving benefits in 1981, but did not provide any information
on when benefits would start in late beneficiaries.
The Russian government may have decided the order of the
benefits because it prioritized population growth in areas with
labor shortages that were important in terms of industrial production (Weber & Goodman, 1981). Perevedentsev (1974), a
highly respected population economist, wrote, ‘‘The task for
the next 10 years is to balance the distribution of the country’s
population and natural resources. It is the East that has the
most abundant natural resources.’’18 The early beneficiaries
were less populous and only 26.5% of the Russian population
resided there. Figure B1 shows a map of the rollout of benefits
across Russia. Table 1 shows that the share of employed
women, educated individuals, women living in rural areas,
and children in preschool were similar in early and late beneficiaries in 1980. However, the population in early beneficiaries
was, on average, younger relative to the late beneficiaries,
which may explain higher fertility rates in early beneficiaries.
Women were aware of the details of the maternity benefit
program even before the ruling because the introduction of
this program was widely publicized in major Russian newspapers. The first mention of the program was on December
2, 1980, in both major Russian newspapers Pravda, 1980,
17
The ruling also mentioned plans for expanding other services such as
kindergartens and housing (Sovmin, 1981a). However, these plans were
vague, they were for the next ten-year period, not to be implemented in
stages, and not mentioned in future rulings (Presidium Verhovnogo
Soveta, 1981; Sovmin, 1981b). Thus, I measure the effect of maternity
benefits not inclusive of these plans; year fixed effects account for any
other changes happening at the national level.
18
Chinn (1977) wrote that ‘‘Siberia and the Far East should grow relative to the rest of the country.’’
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and Izvestija, 1980). Several other articles discussed these
plans in more detail before and after the official announcement in January and mentioned that they would be introduced in waves starting in 1981 (Pravda, 1981a; Izvestija,
1981a).19 The newspapers also mentioned receiving a lot of
mail with positive reviews of the program, and one woman
wrote that people in every house in her town were talking
about the new program (Pravda, 1981b; Izvestija, 1981b).
Later, on September 2, 1981, a government ruling
announced the exact timing of the start of benefits across
regions (Presidium Verhovnogo Soveta, 1981; Sovmin,
1981b), and it appeared in a major newspaper shortly afterward (Izvestija, 1981d). This time it stated that the early
beneficiaries would receive benefits starting on November
1, 1981. The late beneficiaries would receive benefits starting on November 1, 1982. Women who gave birth after
implementation could receive the monthly paid leave for
the remaining months after implementation until the child
turned 1 year old, but could not receive the one-time birth
transfer (Goskomtrud, 1982). The timing of benefit eligibility depended on the location of permanent work or study
and not on the place of birth of the child or residence.20
V.

Effect of Maternity Benefits on Childbearing
in the Short Run

I analyze whether maternity benefits affected childbearing in the short run by quantifying their effect within a year
of their start. To do this, I construct the general fertility rate
(GFR)—the annual number of births per thousand women
ages 15 to 44. I use nonpublic data on the annual number of
births by oblast from the Russian Federal State Statistics
Service (Rosstat).21 For the denominator, I use the 1989
Russian census to estimate the number of women ages 15 to
44 in each year and oblast. The details for fertility rate estimation are in appendix D.
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FIGURE 1.—DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECT OF MATERNITY BENEFITS
ON FERTILITY RATES

The figure plots the evolution of general fertility rates (GFR) in the early and late beneficiary regions.
The GFR is the number of births per thousand women ages 15 to 44.
Sources: Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) and the 1989 Russian Census.

late beneficiaries did not decrease in 1981, suggesting
women did not delay childbearing after the benefit
announcement. Similar to behavior in early beneficiaries,
GFR in late beneficiaries jumped in 1982 and rose further
in 1983 when benefits were in place for a full year. Finally,
fertility rates in both early and late beneficiaries stayed
higher after the program, suggesting an increase in completed childbearing.
B. Generalized Differences-in-Differences Framework

I next use this two-stage implementation in a generalized
differences-in-differences framework to adjust these raw
comparisons for other covariates (Jacobson, LaLonde, &
Sullivan, 1993),
GFRo;y ¼ a þ cy þ do þ

1979
X

ht  Do  1ðy ¼ tÞ

t¼1975

A. Descriptive Evidence on Childbearing Responses to
Maternity Benefits

The evolution of fertility rates in early and late beneficiary oblasts provides preliminary evidence of a positive
effect of the maternity benefit program on childbearing.
Figure 1 shows that early and late beneficiaries had similar
trends in fertility rates before the program. The GFR in the
early beneficiaries jumped in 1981 and rose further in 1982,
when benefits were in place for a full year. The GFR in the
19
The most detailed description of the law appears on March 31, 1981,
as front-page news in both major Russian newspapers (Izvestija, 1981c;
Pravda, 1981c).
20
Housing shortages and the internal passport system limited geographic
mobility (Brainerd, 1998).
21
These data are reliable to estimate the effect of maternity benefits on
childbearing. I have estimated this effect on GFR constructed using several data sources. All estimates were positive, similar in magnitude, and
statistically different from 0. The data sources were the nonpublic data
from Rosstat, 1989 Census data, 2002 Census data, and 2010 Census
data.

þ

1986
X

pt  Do  1ðy ¼ tÞ þ Xo;y þ eo;y ; (1)

t¼1981

where GFRo;y is the general fertility rate in oblast o and
year y, c is a set of year fixed effects that capture changes
common to all oblasts, Do equals 1 if an oblast was an early
beneficiary, and d is a set of oblast fixed effects that capture
time-invariant oblast level differences. The dummy for the
year before the start of the program, 1ðy ¼ 1980Þ, is
omitted, which normalizes the estimates for h and p to 0 in
1980.22 The regression also includes covariates that vary at
the year and oblast level and measure output and economic
activity: amount of bricks, concrete, timber, meat, and
canned goods produced and the value of retail trade.23
22
h and p are vectors that contain coefficients, ht and pt , for years t
1975–1979 and 1981–1986.
23
These covariates represent the most relevant statistics available for
that time period at the oblast and year level, which I manually entered
using Narodnoe Hozyaystvo (National Economy) yearbooks.

696

THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

These covariates test whether the change in fertility rates
was due to other coincidental economic shocks across
regions.
The coefficient p1981 captures the effect of the program
on fertility rates in early beneficiaries in the first two
months; p1982 captures this effect in the first full year. These
coefficients may be biased upward if women in late beneficiaries delayed childbearing in response to the benefit
announcement. I find no evidence of this; fertility rates in
late beneficiaries experienced an insignificant 0.63%
increase between November 1981 and October 1982.24 The
coefficients p1983 to p1986 capture the reversion of the mean
difference to its preprogram level after the late beneficiaries
gained eligibility. If the late beneficiaries increased their
fertility rates once they became eligible for the full year of
benefits, p1983 to p1986 should be smaller in magnitude compared to p1982 , when the two areas differed in eligibility.
The point estimates, h, test whether fertility rates were on
parallel trends before the start of the benefits.
Similarly, I estimate the effect of the replacement rate
(maternity benefits transfers relative to average wages in a
region) on childbearing. Because the benefits were not
region specific, regions with lower wages had higher
replacement rates, resulting in higher relative financial
incentives for childbearing. I incorporate the 1980 oblastlevel replacement rate into equation (1),
GFRo;y ¼ a þ cy þ do þ

1979
X

ht  Do  1ðy ¼ tÞ  Ro

t¼1975

þ

1986
X

pt Do 1ðy ¼ tÞ  Ro þ Xo;y þ eo;y ;

(2)

t¼1981

where Ro is a continuous variable measuring the replacement rate.25 The coefficient of interest is p82 and represents
the effect of a 1 percentage point increase in the replacement rate on GFR one year after the start of benefits.
C. Results: Effect of Maternity Benefits Using Annual Data

Figure 2 displays estimates from equation (1), which
represent the covariate-adjusted differences in fertility rates
between the early and late beneficiaries in a year compared
to the difference in 1980. The results are weighted by the
population of women aged 15 to 44 in 1980 in each oblast.26
The standard errors are clustered at the oblast level to allow
for an arbitrary correlation structure within an oblast.
24
For late beneficiaries, I estimate, GFRo;y;m ¼ a þ c1 yðmÞ þ b3 post 
do þ dm þ eo;y;m , where m represents a month, y(m) is a linear time trend,
dm is a set of month fixed effects, and post is a dummy for the period from
November 1981 to October 1982. The coefficient of interest is b3 .
25
Details for the construction of the replacement rate are in appendix F.
26
The motivation for weighting is to correct for heteroskedasticity that
is related to population size in the oblast by year error terms (Solon, Haider, & Wooldridge, 2015). I fail to reject that the treatment effect coefficients in weighted and unweighted specifications are the same using a
Hausman test.

FIGURE 2.—SHORT-RUN EFFECT OF MATERNITY BENEFITS ON FERTILITY RATES

These coefficients represent the difference in GFR (general fertility rates) between the early and late
beneficiary regions in each year relative to the difference in 1980. I present y and p from equation (1)
using GFR as a dependent variable. The coefficient on year 1981 presents the effect of the program when
maternity benefits were in place in early beneficiaries for two months. The coefficient on year 1982 presents the effect of the program when maternity benefits were in place in early beneficiaries for the full
year. For the coefficients shown as circles, the model includes year and oblast fixed effects; for the coefficients shown as diamonds, the model also adds oblast by year covariates. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors clustered by oblast construct 95% point-wise confidence intervals (dashed lines) for the
coefficients that include oblast by year covariates. Regressions are weighted by the number of women
who are ages 15 to 44 living in an oblast in 1980.
Sources: Rosstat, 1989 Russian Census, Narodnoe Hozyaystvo yearbooks.

There is no difference in GFR trends in the early and late
beneficiaries five years before the program. The point
estimates for years 1975 to 1979 are individually indistinguishable from zero and follow a flat trend. These results
adjusted for covariates support the findings from the
unadjusted series from figure 1.
The results suggest that the increase in maternity benefits
increased fertility rates. Fertility rates rose immediately
once early beneficiaries became eligible for benefits in
1981. As expected, the increase in GFR was larger when
early beneficiaries were eligible for the entire year (1982)
than for part of the year (1981) of benefits. Estimates in
table 2 (column 2) imply that GFR jumped by 2.4 and 6.2
births per 1,000 women of childbearing age in 1981 and
1982.27 This represents a 3.2% and 8.2% increase over a
pretreatment mean of 76.0 in early beneficiaries. The difference between the GFR of early and late beneficiaries reverts
to the preprogram mean due to an increase in fertility rates
in late beneficiaries when they became eligible for the full
year of benefits in 1983. This is evidenced by the fact that
estimates for 1983 to 1986 are smaller in magnitude than
estimates for 1982 and are not statistically different from 0.
Fertility rates rose more in areas with higher replacement
rates. The coefficients in column 3 of table 2 represent the
difference in the marginal effect of a 1 percentage point
increase in the replacement rate on GFR between early and
late beneficiaries in a year relative to this difference in
1980. The pattern of estimates in column 3 supports the
finding of an increase in GFR in column 2 and adds that this
increase was higher in areas with greater relative financial
incentives. In the first year of benefit receipt, GFR increased
27

Estimates are similar in magnitude and statistical significance in a
differences-in-differences specification that includes oblast-specific linear
time trends and excludes interactions of the early beneficiary dummy with
years 1975 to 1979.
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TABLE 2.—SHORT-RUN EFFECT OF MATERNITY BENEFITS ON FERTILITY RATES
General Fertility Rate (Mean in 1980: 76.0)
Dependent Variable
Before program
(1975 to 1979)  Early
After early beneficiaries eligible
(1981)  Early
(1982)  Early
After everyone eligible
(1983 to 1986)  Early
R2
Covariates
Oblast-year cells
Oblasts

(1)

(2)

(3)

–0.309
[0.779]

0.142
[0.632]

%Replace

0.003
[0.019]

2.218***
[0.645]
6.748***
[1.347]

2.354***
[0.634]
6.192***
[1.031]

%Replace

0.065***
[0.018]
0.173***
[0.028]

1.940
[2.233]
0.945
Year FE, Oblast FE
984
82

0.502
[1.292]
0.962
Year FE, Oblast FE, Xo,y
984
82

%Replace

% Replace

0.007
[0.031]
0.964
Year FE, Oblast FE, Xo,y
972
81

Columns 1 to 2 summarize the coefficients in figure 2 and show interactions of grouped year and early beneficiary dummies using equation (1). Grouped years: before benefits (1975–1979); benefits in place for
two months (1981) and benefits in place the whole year (1982) in early beneficiaries; after all regions eligible for benefits (1983–1986). Estimates for 1980 are normalized to 0, because it is omitted. The unit of observation is oblast by year. Column 1 includes grouped year and oblast fixed effects; column 2 adds oblast-level covariates; and column 3 adds annual oblast-level covariates. Column 3 shows interactions of year and
early beneficiary dummies with an oblast-level replacement rate of benefits in 1980 using equation (2). Standard errors clustered at the oblast level are in brackets. Regressions are weighted by the number of women
ages 15 to 44 living in an oblast in 1980. Statistically significant at ***0.01, **0.05, and *0.10.
Sources: See the sources for figure 2, and 1994 Russian Statistical Yearbook.

by 0.17 births per woman in response to a 1 percentage
point increase in the replacement rate.
A potential threat to internal validity of these estimates
could occur if coincidental policies or economic factors
affected outcomes. It is unlikely that the estimated effect of
maternity benefits is due to other factors because these
would need to discontinuously change in 1981 in early beneficiaries and in 1982 in late beneficiaries. In addition to
controlling for covariates, I examine the evolution of the
growth of industrial product, production of oil, and natural
gas in a subset of early beneficiaries and in all of Russia.28
In contrast to hypotheses that the increase in fertility rates
was due to other factors, all indicators in figure B2 stayed
on the same trend around the start of benefits.
D. Results: Effects of Maternity Benefits Using
Monthly Data

Fertility rates may have gone up six months after women
found out about the benefits or even earlier, depending on the
prevalence of illegal abortions. In the 1980s, abortion was the
most widely used method of fertility regulation in Russia, in
part because women had limited access to and education on
other types of contraception (Popov, 1991).29 Abortions were
legal up to the twelfth week of pregnancy, but illegal abortions were also prevalent. The analysis using annual data
hides the month-to-month dynamics of fertility rate adjustment. To examine these dynamics, I construct month-level
fertility rates using the 2002 Census (see appendix D).
The Census does not include individuals who were born
in Russia but emigrated or died before the Census. Consequently, estimates of the number of births using the Census
28
Aggregated data on economic indicators are available only in sixteen
of the early beneficiary oblasts.
29
The adjustment of fertility rates could take longer if women were
using contraceptive methods that required medical help to remove or a
waiting period until full fecundity.

are understated. To correct these estimates, I use the true
number of births by oblast and year from the vital statistics
data. Specifically, I calculate the proportion of births that
are still present in the Census, po;y ¼ ðBCo;y Þ=ðBVo;y Þ, where
BCo;y is the number of births in oblast, o, in year, y, recorded
in the census, and BVo;y are the number of births in oblast, o,
in year, y, in the vital statistics. Thus, I scale the Census
estimates by the proportion of births that are still present in
the Census to calculate BAo;y;m ¼ BCo;y;m =po;y . This procedure
scales birthrates in each year by a common factor and
assumes no differential monthly mortality or mobility.
Thus, these estimates preserve the seasonal variation but
are rescaled to be comparable to the annual estimates.
I use month-level fertility rates to estimate the following
extension of equation (1):
FRo;y;m ¼ a þ cy þ cm;o þ do þ

1983 X
12
X

ptðkÞ  Do

t¼1979 k¼1

 1ðy ¼ t; m ¼ kÞ þ Xo;y þ eo;y;m ;

(3)

where FRo;y;m is the fertility rate in oblast o, year y and
month m, c is a set of month-by-oblast fixed effects that
capture seasonality in fertility rates in each oblast, 1() is a
dummy for month of observation, while the rest of the variables are the same as in equation (1). The estimates for p
are normalized 0 in 1978 because this year is omitted.30
The coefficient, ptðkÞ , is the difference between fertility rates
in early and late beneficiaries in year t and month k compared to the difference in 1978.
Estimates of p in figure 3 suggest that some of the
increase in fertility rates was due to forgone abortions. Fertility rates in early beneficiary oblasts rose about six months
after (June 1981) women found out about the benefits
30
p contains coefficients, ptðkÞ for years, t, from 1979 to 1983 and
months, k, from 1 to 12.
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FIGURE 3.—SHORT-RUN EFFECT OF MATERNITY BENEFITS ON MONTHLY FERTILITY RATES

Presented are y and p from equation (3), showing monthly differences in fertility rates between early and late beneficiaries from January 1979 to December 1983 relative to the difference in 1978, which is 0 by
construction. For weights and standard errors, see notes in figure 2.
Sources: Rosstat, 1989 and 2002 Russian Censuses, and Narodnoe Hozyaystvo yearbooks.

(December 1980), which may be attributable to an increase
in forgone abortions. This is before benefits began and may
reflect that women could receive some benefits even if they
had a child before November 1981, and while women knew
benefits would start in 1981, they did not know the month
of the start until September 1981. Fertility rates rose even
further between November 1981 and October 1982 and
stayed higher in every month during that period. Finally,
the difference in fertility rates declined once women in late
beneficiaries also received the benefits.

TABLE 3.—SHORT-RUN EFFECT OF MATERNITY BENEFITS ON
FERTILITY RATES BY PARITY

Dependent Variable:
Before Program Mean in 1980:
Before program
(1975 to 1979)  Early Beneficiary
After Early Beneficiaries Eligible
(1981)  Early Beneficiary
(1982)  Early Beneficiary

VI.

Long-Run Effect of Maternity Benefits on
Childbearing

This short-run increase in fertility rates may have been the
result of two channels: women gave birth sooner or had children they would not have otherwise had. Given that the goal
of maternity benefits was to induce women to have more
children, I test whether maternity benefits resulted in an
increase in completed childbearing in three ways, estimating
the response in fertility rates by parity, the change in the
composition of mothers after the start of the program, and
the effect of the program on fertility rates over its duration.
A. Effect of Maternity Benefits on Fertility Rates by Parity

As a first test of whether completed childbearing
increased, I examine the response of fertility rates by parity.
An increase in first birth fertility rates likely reflected
women having desired children sooner because most
women in Russia had at least one child. However, an
increase in higher-parity fertility rates suggests women had
children they would not have otherwise had. I construct first
birth and higher-parity fertility rates using the 2010 census
data.31 I then use equation (1) to test whether the increase
in fertility rates was due to first or higher-parity births.
The results suggest that the short-run increase in fertility
rates was due to an increase in completed childbearing,
31
Births by parity and oblast are not published in this period. See
appendix D, which also describes adjustment for measurement error
(similar to section IVD).

After Everyone Eligible
(1983 to 1986)  Early Beneficiary
2

R
Covariates
Oblast-year-month cells
Oblasts

(1)
Higher-Order
Birth

(2)
First
Birth

37.4

38.5

0.385
[0.766]

0.523
[0.509]

2.616***
[0.570]
6.717***
[0.865]

0.259
[0.260]
0.524
[0.465]

2.856**
2.350***
[1.164]
[0.830]
0.932
0.955
Year FE, MonthYear FE,
Oblast FE,
Month-Oblast FE,
Oblast FE, Xo,y Oblast FE, Xo,y
11,808
11,808
82
82

See the notes for table 2. The dependent variable in column 1 is the fertility rate of second- and
higher-order births, and in column 2 it is the fertility rate of first births. The unit of observation is at the
year-month-oblast level. Statistically significant at ***0.05 and **0.10.
Sources: Rosstat, 1989 and 2010 censuses, Narodnoe Hozyaystvo yearbooks.

because only higher-parity fertility rates increased after the
start of benefits. Table 3 shows that the higher-parity fertility rate in early beneficiaries increased by 17.9% (6.7
divided by the preprogram mean of 37.4) in the first year of
benefit receipt. The late beneficiaries responded to the program after they became eligible for it; the difference
between the fertility rates of early and late beneficiaries
shrank starting in 1983. This difference did not shrink to 0,
suggesting a greater increase in fertility rates in the early
beneficiaries. Women in early beneficiaries may be more
responsive to benefits if they have lower opportunity costs,
fewer housing-size constraints, and more resource constraints.32 In contrast, the first birth fertility rate in early
beneficiaries decreased by an insignificant 1.4% (0.5/38.5).

32
Section VI contains a detailed discussion of heterogeneous responses
and mechanisms.
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TABLE 4.—EFFECT OF MATERNITY BENEFITS ON THE COMPOSITION OF MOTHERS

Dependent Variable:
Before Program Mean in 1980:
Before Program
(1975 to 1977)  Early Beneficiary
After Early Beneficiaries Eligible
(1981)  Early Beneficiary
(1982)  Early Beneficiary
After Everyone Eligible
(1983 to 1986)  Early Beneficiary
R2
Covariates
Observations
Oblasts

(1)
Age at
Second and
Third Birth
26.7
0.197
[0.188]

(2)
Interval to
Second and
Third Birth
4.7
0.0918
[0.104]

0.0545
[0.202]
0.493**
[0.232]

0.13
[0.162]
0.349**
[0.157]

0.297*
[0.159]
0.019
Oblast FE, Xo,y,
Year FE
28,745
76

0.0238
[0.130]
0.023
Oblast FE,
Xo,y, Year FE
28,745
76

See the notes for table 2. The dependent variable in column 1 is the age at second and third birth (in
years), and in column 2 the interval to second and third birth from a previous birth (in years). I omit the
years 1978 to 1980, so estimates for those years are normalized to 0. The unit of analysis is a motherbirth observation. Statistically significant at **0.05, *0.10.
Sources: 1994 Russian microcensus, Narodnoe Hozyaystvo yearbooks.

B. Effect of Maternity Benefits on the
Composition of Mothers

As a second test of whether completed childbearing
increased, I quantify changes in the composition of mothers
who gave birth after the program. The increase in fertility
rates was likely due to women having more children—if
women who had children after the program were older and
had waited longer to have another child. Given the finding
that the increase in childbearing is entirely due to the
increase in higher-parity births, an increase in completed
childbearing would be reflected in an increase in the age of
the mother at higher-parity births.
To analyze the composition of women by parity, I use
the 1994 Russian microcensus (Goskomstat-MPIDR, 2004)
to obtain characteristics of mothers based on when their
children were born. No vital statistics data on mothers’
characteristics are available. The microcensus is not publicly available, and I use the 0.25% sample of the population at the Max Planck Institute for Demographic
Research.33 I estimate equation (1) using the age of mother
at the birth of her second and third children and years since
last birth as dependent variables.34
I find evidence that completed childbearing increased
because women who had higher-parity children after the
program were older and waited longer to have a child.
Table 4 shows that women who had second and third chil33
Appendix E contains a description of these data. It is impossible to link
mothers to children using the 1989, 2002, and 2010 Censuses because they
do not contain individual-level data.
34
The majority of births were parity three and lower. Because I have
only a 0.25% sample of the population, I observe too few fourth and
higher-parity births for analysis.
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dren in the first year of benefit receipt were 5.9 (0.49312;
column 1) months older, and waited 4.2 (0.34912; column
2) more months to have a child. Thus, the increase in
higher-parity births is likely not due to women having these
births earlier, but rather due to women having children they
would not have otherwise had.
C. Effect of Maternity Benefits on Long-Run Childbearing

As a third test of whether completed childbearing
increased, I examine the evolution of fertility rates for the
ten-year duration of the program. Fertility rates would have
risen temporarily and then fallen below previous levels if
women only shifted the timing of childbearing. If true, this
would have resulted in a 0 net increase in fertility rates over
the duration of the program. However, fertility rates would
have stayed consistently higher for the duration of the program if women increased their completed childbearing.
To quantify the effects of maternity benefits on childbearing for the duration of the program, I employ an eventstudy framework. This allows me to study the dynamics of
the response over a longer time period, which compares fertility rates within an oblast before and after the program
compared to fertility rates right before the program (Bailey,
Malkova, & McLaren, in press). I estimate,
GFRo;y ¼ a þ cy þ do þ

1
X

ht  1ðy  y ¼ tÞ

t¼5

þ

11
X

pt  1ðy  y ¼ tÞ þ Xo;y þ eo;y ;

(4)

t¼1

where y is the year before the start of the program
(y ¼ 1980 for early beneficiaries, while y ¼ 1981 for late
beneficiaries), and 1ðÞ is a dummy that represents years
relative to the start of the program. This equation includes
year fixed effects that capture nationwide changes in policy
and economic conditions, cy , oblast fixed effects, do , and
oblast by year covariates: amount of meat and canned goods
produced, and the value of retail trade, Xo,y.35 pt measures
the effect of maternity benefits on fertility rates t years after
the start of the program.36 Note that t ¼ 0 is omitted. Estimates of h document if preexisting trends bias estimates of
p, and if ‘‘effects’’ preceded the program.
The event-study analysis has a causal interpretation if the
timing of benefit receipt was conditionally random. The
government likely chose the early beneficiary oblasts
because of their fixed, long-standing characteristics. It has
always been the goal to increase population and labor supply in early beneficiaries because of their importance in
industrial production. For causality, the early and late beneficiaries may be different; for instance, the early benefici35

There are fewer covariates than in equation (1) because they are not
available for all years.
36
p1 should be the smallest, because benefits were in place for only two
months in the first year.
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FIGURE 4.—LONG-RUN EFFECT OF MATERNITY BENEFITS ON FERTILITY RATES

TABLE 5.—LONG-RUN EFFECT OF MATERNITY BENEFITS ON FERTILITY RATES

Dependent Variable:
Before Program Mean:
Before program event years
(5 to 1)
After program event years
(1 to 3)

aries have a higher fertility rate than the late beneficiaries.
This is because the inclusion of oblast fixed effects, do , in
equation (4) accounts for fixed differences in characteristics
across regions, and thus takes care of the government selection of regions based on their fixed characteristics. However, for causality, conditional on covariates, the year an
oblast started receiving maternity benefits needs to be random. This assumption would be violated if the government
decided the year of maternity benefits start based on previous trends of fertility rates or determinants of childbearing. Thus, I test whether the percent change in fertility rates
from 1976 to 1980 predicts the year maternity benefits
started. I find that the change in fertility rates has no economically meaningful or significant effect on the year of
start.37 This evidence suggests that the government did not
decide the year of eligibility based on previous trends in
fertility rates. Finally, parallel GFR pretrends in early and
late beneficiaries (see figure 2) further support the conditional randomness assumption.
I find evidence that completed childbearing increased
because the increase in childbearing was sustained for the
entire duration of the program. In figure 4, I present eventstudy coefficients h and p from equation (4) that show
changes in fertility rates relative to the year before the benefits started. Estimates to the left of the vertical axis capture
the evolution of fertility rates before the program, and estimates to the right of the vertical axis capture the effect of
maternity benefits on fertility rates one to ten years after the
program started. Table 5 shows that fertility rates were
14.6% percent higher one to ten years after the program
started. There is no evidence that differential preexisting
trends bias this analysis or that effects preceded the program because estimates of y display a flat trend before the
program. Moreover, table 5 shows that higher-parity fertility rates were on average 27.8% percent higher for the tenyear duration of the program.
37
I perform, Year Starto ¼ a þ b  %Change in GFRo þ eo , where I
use the number of women age 15 to 44 as weights. The coefficient b is
0.0068, with a standard error of 0.0109.

(2)
HigherOrder Fertility
Rate

70

34.6

0.061
[1.018]
9.063***
[1.497]
10.71***
[2.277]
10.84***
[3.463]
0.914
Year FE,
Oblast FE, Xo,y

(4 to 6)
I present y and p from equation (4) using GFR as a dependent variable. The coefficients are the evolution of GFR conditional on covariates five years before and eleven years after maternity benefits started.
Years since maternity benefits equal 0 if birth year is 1980 in early beneficiaries, and 1981 in late beneficiaries. For weights, standard errors, and sources, see figure 2.

(1)
General
Fertility
Rate

(7 to 10)
2

R
Covariates
Observations
Oblasts

1,444
82

1.359
[0.985]
7.004***
[0.999]
9.985***
[1.647]
11.82***
[2.636]
0.887
Year FE,
Month-Oblast FE,
Oblast FE, Xo,y
17,328
82

The coefficients are dummies of grouped years to maternity benefits (event years) from equation (4)
where the GFR (column 1) and the higher-order fertility rate (column 2) are dependent variables. The
year before benefits started is omitted, so estimates are normalized to 0 for that event year. The unit of
observation is oblast by year for column 1 and oblast by year by month for column 2. For weights, standard errors and sources, see figure 4. Statistically significant at ***0.01.

VII.

Heterogeneity in Responses to Maternity Benefits

Next, I examine the effect of maternity benefits by
urbanicity and education to shed light on the types of
women who increased childbearing in response to maternity
benefits. A greater fertility rate increase in more rural and
less educated regions could be due to lower opportunity
costs, fewer housing size constraints, or more resource constraints. First, both rural and less educated women had
lower opportunity costs because of lower wages, making
the benefit a higher fraction of their salary.38 Second, rural
women had fewer housing-size constraints due to larger
housing size relative to urban women, allowing them more
housing space to accommodate another child. Third, rural
and less educated women were more resource constrained
due to lower wages, making the financial aspect of maternity benefits more valuable to them.
To quantify the effect of maternity benefits by urbanicity
and education, I follow Finkelstein (2007), using the characteristics of oblasts from the 1979 Russian census, to estimate,
GFRo;y ¼ a þ cy þ

1
X

ht  Zo  1ðy  y ¼ tÞ

t¼6

þ

10
X

pt  Zo  1ðy  y ¼ tÞ þ do

t¼1

þ Xo;y þ eo;y ;

(5)

where Zo represents continuous variables at the oblast level,
measured in 1979, in separate regressions: share of women
38
Rural women mostly worked as low-paid manual laborers and had
work flexibility due to the seasonal nature of their work (Bridger, 1987).

MATERNITY BENEFITS AND CHILDBEARING
FIGURE 5.—HETEROGENEOUS RESPONSES OF FERTILITY RATES TO MATERNITY
BENEFITS ACROSS REGIONS

areas continued increasing by more for the first eight years
after the start of the program. However, the difference
across regions disappeared ten years after the start of the
program, which is consistent with benefits losing their value
due to inflation and the end of the program.
The greater increase in fertility rates in more rural and
less educated regions provides suggestive evidence that the
magnitudes of effects of maternity benefits may depend on
opportunity costs, housing size constraints, and resource
constraints. However, this study is unable to distinguish
between the importance of these channels due to the lack
of individual-level data.
VIII.

I present y and p from equation (5) using GFR as a dependent variable, representing interactions of
event-year dummies with an oblast-level characteristic measured in 1979. (A) Share of women age 15 to
44 in rural areas and (B) share of individuals with less than high school education. For weights and standard errors see figure 2.
Sources: Figure 2 sources and 1979 Census.

age 15 to 44 living in a rural area and share of individuals age
10 and older who have not completed high school. All other
covariates remain the same as in equation (4), except now the
event-year dummies, 1ðy  y ¼ tÞ, are interacted with Zo .
This strategy tests for a break in any preexisting differences in the level or trend of fertility rates across regions at
the start of the program that is correlated with Zo . The identifying assumption is that without benefits, the differences in
fertility rates before the start of the program would have continued on the same trend. This strategy does not assume that
areas that differ in their composition of residents had the
same level or growth of fertility rates before the program.
Maternity benefits are associated with a greater increase
in fertility rates among more rural and less educated areas.
Figure 5 plots estimates of y and p from equation (5) that
correspond to interactions of the event-year dummies with
variables measuring a region’s rural (panel A) and education status (panel B) in separate regressions. Table B1 summarizes these estimates. The coefficients are individually
statistically indistinguishable from 0 in the years leading up
to the program. This indicates that before the program, fertility rates evolved similarly in areas with different shares
of urban women and educated individuals. However, after
the program, the coefficients, p, jump discontinuously in
both panels. This indicates a larger increase in fertility rates
in more rural compared to more urban areas and a larger
increase in fertility rates in less educated compared to more
educated areas. The GFR in more rural and less educated
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Adult Outcomes of Children Born before and
after Maternity Benefits

Given the increase in childbearing and the change in
composition of mothers, I examine the adult outcomes of
children born after maternity benefits. For this purpose, I
use 2010 Russian Census data, which include all individuals
living in Russia in 2010. These data are tabulated based on
the individual’s oblast and year of birth. I focus on outcomes such as percent completed college, employed,
receiving public assistance, married, teen mothers, and the
average number of children.
I use a differences-in-differences framework to estimate
the effect of maternity benefits on adult outcomes of children
born one year after the program in the following equation,
Yo;y ¼ a þ p81  Do  1ðy ¼ 81Þ þ p82  Do
 1ðy ¼ 82Þ þ cy þ do þ do  y þ eo;y ;

(6)

where Yo;y is an outcome in 2010 for children born in oblast,
o, and in year, y (1976 to 1982); Do is a dummy for being born
in an early beneficiary oblast; 1ðy ¼ 81Þ is a dummy for birth
year 1981, and 1ðy ¼ 82Þ is a dummy for birth year 1982, do
are oblast fixed effects, cy are birth year fixed effects; do  y
are linear time trends for every oblast, which control for any
differential linear trends in outcomes within an oblast. The
coefficients p81 and p82 capture the effect of maternity benefits on outcomes of children born in 1981 and 1982.
The estimates of the effect on outcomes reflect the combination of the direct and the indirect effect of maternity
benefits. The direct effect could be due to the parental time
or household income channels. First, adult outcomes may
be affected if mothers take longer leaves. Second, adult outcomes may be affected if paid leave raises household
income or lowers it if mothers take a lot more leave.39 The
indirect effect could be due to the parental composition and
cohort- and household-size channels. First, the average
39
Expansions of maternity leave have both positive and no effects on
economic and health outcomes in childhood and adulthood (Baker &
Milligan, 2010; Carneiro, Loken, & Salvanes, 2015; Dahl et al., 2016;
Dustmann & Schönberg, 2012; Liu & Skans, 2010; Rossin, 2011). Early
life conditions may affect outcomes later in life (Van den Berg, Lindeboom, & Portrait, 2006).

702

THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
TABLE 6.—EFFECT OF MATERNITY BENEFITS ON ADULT EDUCATIONAL, ECONOMIC, AND FAMILY STRUCTURE OUTCOMES

Dependent
Variable:
Mean If Born in 1979

(1)
% at Least
Some College

(2)
Education
Index

(3)
% Men
Employed

(4)
% Women
Employed

(5)
% Public
Assistance

(6)
%
Married

(7)
% Teen
Mothers

(8)
Number of
Children

33.1

5.3

85.8

75.9

6.6

54.3

19.0

1.3

0.006
[0.010]
0.000
[0.010]
0.999
574
82

0.305
[0.192]
0.282
[0.227]
0.996
574
82

0.249
[0.244]
0.384
[0.256]
0.998
574
82

0.097
[0.068]
0.112
[0.102]
0.995
574
82

0.296
[0.322]
0.326
[0.358]
0.995
574
82

0.084
[0.203]
0.362
[0.342]
0.990
574
82

0.001
[0.005]
0.001
[0.006]
0.998
574
82

After early beneficiaries eligible
(1981)  Early
0.165
[0.184]
(1982)  Early
0.240
[0.214]
0.998
R2
Oblast-year cells
574
Oblasts
82

The coefficients are the difference in outcomes between the children born in early compared to late beneficiaries in 1981 and 1982 relative to the difference from 1976 to 1980. I present p81 and p82 from equation
(6) using adult outcomes as dependent variables. The unit of observation is birth oblast by birth year, the analysis includes outcomes of children born between 1976 and 1982. All columns include birth year, and
oblast of birth fixed effects, and linear time trends interacted with birth oblast fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by the number of children born in each oblast in 1979. Standard errors clustered at the oblast-level
are in brackets.
Source: 2010 Russian Census.

child’s adult outcomes may change due to the change in the
composition of mothers. The greater fertility increase in
less educated and more rural regions suggests that the
increase in births was due to more disadvantaged mothers.
This could lead the average child to also be more disadvantaged.40 Second, the average child’s adult outcomes may
change due to being part of a larger cohort or due to having
more siblings.
I do not find evidence that maternity benefits had an
effect on children’s educational, economic, and family
structure outcomes between the ages of 25 and 32. Table 6
shows that the effects on college completion and the linear
education index are negative in sign but small in magnitude
and not statistically significant.41 Children born in the first
year of benefit receipt are 0.24 percentage points less likely
to complete college, which represents a 0.73% decline.
IX.

Discussion and Conclusion

Low fertility rates are an important concern for many
OECD countries that have implemented various familyfriendly policies. I find an immediate response in fertility
rates after the introduction of paid parental leave and cash
transfers in Russia. Moreover, I find that the effects on fertility rates persist in the long run. These results indicate that
maternity benefits affected both the timing and the number
of children women had.
These results imply that childbearing is elastic with
respect to the cost of a child. A back-of-the-envelope calculation quantifies this price elasticity. I use estimates from
Russian demographers to calculate the cost of a child as the
sum of the costs over the first 18 years of a child’s life
(Valentei, 1987). In Russia, maternity benefits decreased
40
Children of disadvantaged mothers may also be disadvantaged:
family characteristics may be important for future earnings, and wellbeing (Almond & Currie, 2011).
41
I find no evidence that these results are due to measurement error
from mortality and emigration. I construct the GFR with 2010 Census
data and use it as a dependent variable in equation (6). I find an 8.7%
(p82 ) increase in GFR, which is similar to the 8.2% increase in GFR (table
2) using data without measurement error.

the cost of a child by 2.2% (see appendix G). According to
estimates in table 2, this is associated with an 8.2% increase
in fertility rates (6.2/76) during the year after the start of the
program, which means that the short-run price elasticity of
childbearing equals 3.7 (8.2/2.2).
How does the effect of maternity benefits on childbearing
in Russia compare to effects of family benefits in other
countries? To address this question, I compare the estimates
of short-run elasticities from other studies, which range
from 4.4 to 0.54 (see figure B3). The estimate of the elasticity in this study is in this range of other countries.42 I
construct corresponding confidence intervals for these elasticities using a parametric bootstrap method. The confidence intervals of all but the study on Israel overlap.
This study has three caveats. First, the results of this
study apply in a specific context. In Soviet Russia, women
had high labor force participation rates, earned substantially
less than men, the age-wage profile was flatter than in other
countries, and child care was widespread and heavily subsidized. The long-term effect of maternity benefits may differ
in countries with different female labor market characteristics and the availability of other social programs.
Second, this study cannot disentangle the precise
mechanisms contributing to the increase in childbearing.
More rural and less educated regions experienced greater
increases in childbearing, which is consistent with several
potential mechanisms: opportunity costs, housing-size constraints, and resource constraints. However, the lack of individual-level data limits the identification of the most important mechanism. Further work should explore both the
characteristics of women who change their behavior and
the interaction of their response with the characteristics of
the context. Such an analysis is valuable for countries that
want to design effective maternity benefit programs.
Third, the lack of an effect of maternity benefits on outcomes in adulthood may not translate into a lack of a direct
42
Table B2 shows that key demographic and economic characteristics
in Russia in 1980 are comparable to those in Austria, Spain, Italy, the
United States, and Sweden over 2010 to 2013.
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effect in adulthood or in childhood. If a mother’s characteristics affect the characteristics of her child in adulthood,
then this finding may indicate that maternity benefits have a
direct effect of making adult outcomes more advantaged.
For instance, no effect on educational attainment in adulthood may reflect that the direct benefit of maternity benefits
(increase in educational attainment) counteracted that children born as a result of maternity benefits had less educated
mothers. Moreover, the transition to a market economy in
the 1990s may have been a big enough shock to mask direct
effects that were present in childhood. I am unable to investigate this, because data on childhood outcomes in the
1980s are not available.
To conclude, this study is the first to find a positive longterm effect of maternity benefits on childbearing. My estimates imply that the program induced about 5 million births
during its ten-year duration at a cost of roughly 2,830 rubles
per birth induced (see appendix G). At the time, the cost
represented 1.4 times the average national yearly salary in
1980. This study conveys a hopeful message that maternity
benefits can succeed in their goal of leading women to have
more children in the long term.
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